In a …nancial system where balance sheets are continuously marked to market, asset price changes show up immediately in changes in net worth, and elicit responses from …nancial intermediaries who adjust the size of their balance sheets. We document evidence that marked-to-market leverage is strongly procyclical. Such behavior has aggregate consequences. Changes in aggregate balance sheets for intermediaries forecast changes in risk appetite in …nancial markets, as measured by the innovations in the VIX index. Aggregate liquidity can be seen as the rate of change of the aggregate balance sheet of the …nancial intermediaries.
Introduction
In a …nancial system where balance sheets are continuously marked to market, changes in asset prices show up immediately on the balance sheet, and so have an immediate impact on the net worth of all constituents of the …nancial system.
The net worth of leveraged …nancial intermediaries are especially sensitive to ‡uc-tuations in asset prices given the highly leveraged nature of such intermediaries' balance sheets.
Our focus in this paper is on the reactions of the …nancial intermediaries to changes in their net worth, and the market-wide consequences of such reactions.
If the …nancial intermediaries were passive and do not adjust their balance sheets to changes in net worth, then leverage would fall when total assets rise. Change in leverage and change in balance sheet size would then be negatively related.
However, as we will see below, the evidence points to a strongly positive relationship between changes in leverage and changes in balance sheet size. Far from being passive, the evidence points to …nancial intermediaries adjusting their balance sheets actively, and doing so in such a way that leverage is high during booms and low during busts.
Procyclical leverage can be seen as a consequence of the active management of balance sheets by …nancial intermediaries who respond to changes in prices and measured risk. For …nancial intermediaries, their models of risk and economic capital dictate active management of their overall value at risk (VaR) through adjustments of their balance sheets. Credit ratings are a key determinant of their cost of funding, and they will attempt to manage key …nancial ratios so as to hit their credit rating targets.
From the point of view of each …nancial intermediary, decision rules that result in procyclical leverage are readily understandable. However, there are ag-gregate consequences of such behavior for the …nancial system as a whole that are not taken into consideration by an individual …nancial intermediary. We exhibit evidence that such behavior has aggregate consequences on overall …nancial conditions, risk appetite and the ampli…cation of …nancial cycles.
Our paper has three objectives. Our …rst objective is to document evidence on the relationship between balance sheet size and leverage for a group of …nancial intermediaries -the major Wall Street investment banks -for whom the ideal of balance sheets that are continuously marked to market is a good approximation of reality. We show that leverage is strongly procyclical for these banks, and that the margin of adjustment on the balance sheet is through repos and reverse repos (and other collateralized borrowing and lending).
Our second objective is to outline the aggregate consequences of procyclical leverage, and document evidence that expansions and contractions of balance sheets have important asset pricing consequences through shifts in market-wide risk appetite. In particular, we show that changes in aggregate intermediary balance sheet size can forecast innovations in market-wide risk premiums as measured by the di¤erence between the VIX index and realized volatility. We see this result as being very signi…cant. Previous work in asset pricing has shown that innovations in the VIX index capture key components of asset pricing that conventional empirical models have been unable to address fully. By being able to forecast shifts in risk appetite, we hope to inject a new element in thinking about risk appetite and asset prices. The shift in risk appetite is closely related to other notions of market and funding liquidity, as used by Gromb and Vayanos (2002) and Brunnermeier and Pedersen (2005b) . One of our contributions is to explain the origins of funding liquidity in terms of …nancial intermediary behavior.
Our third objective is to shed light on the concept of "liquidity" as used in common discourse about …nancial market conditions. In the …nancial press and other market commentary, asset price booms are sometimes attributed to "excess liquidity"in the …nancial system. Financial commentators are fond of using the associated metaphors, such as the …nancial markets being "awash with liquidity", or liquidity "sloshing around". However, the precise sense in which "liquidity"is being used in such contexts is often unclear.
We propose an economic counterpart to the notion of the market being "awash with liquidity". Aggregate liquidity can be understood as the rate of growth of aggregate balance sheets. When …nancial intermediaries' balance sheets are generally strong, their leverage is too low. The …nancial intermediaries hold surplus capital, and they will attempt to …nd ways in which they can employ their surplus capital. In a loose analogy with manufacturing …rms, we may see the …nancial system as having "surplus capacity". For such surplus capacity to be utilized, the intermediaries must expand their balance sheets. On the liabilities side, they take on more short-term debt. On the asset side, they search for potential borrowers that they can lend to. Aggregate liquidity is intimately tied to how hard the …nancial intermediaries search for borrowers.
The outline of our paper is as follows. We begin with a review of some very basic balance sheet arithmetic on the relationship between leverage and total assets.
The purpose of this initial exercise is to motivate our empirical investigation of the balance sheet changes of …nancial intermediaries in section 3. Having outlined the facts, in section 5, we show that changes in aggregate repo positions of the major …nancial intermediaries can forecast innovations in the volatility risk-premium, where the volatility risk premium is de…ned as the di¤erence between the VIX index and realized volability. We conclude with discussions of the implications of our …ndings for …nancial cycles.
Some Basic Balance Sheet Arithmetic
What is the relationship between leverage and balance sheet size? This question raises important issues, both conceptually and empirically. We begin with some very elementary balance sheet arithmetic, so as to focus ideas.
Before looking at the evidence for …nancial intermediaries, let us think about the relationship between balance sheet size and leverage for a household. The household owns a house …nanced with a mortgage. The balance sheet looks like this.
Assets
Liabilities House Equity Mortgage For concreteness, suppose the house is worth 100, the mortgage value is 90, and so the household has net worth (equity) of 10.
Assets Liabilities 100 10 90
Leverage is de…ned as the ratio of total assets to equity, and is given by 100=10 = 10. What happens to leverage as total assets ‡uctuate? Denote by A the market value of total assets and E is the market value of equity. We make the simplifying assumption that the market value of debt stays roughly constant at 90 for small shifts in the value of total assets. Total leverage is then
Leverage is inversely related to total assets. This is just saying that when the price of my house goes up, my net worth increases, and so my leverage goes down. We can ask the same question for …rms, and we will address this question for three di¤erent types of …rms.
Non-…nancial …rms
Commercial banks Security dealers and brokers (including investment banks).
If a …rm were passive in the face of ‡uctuating asset prices, then leverage would vary inversely with total assets. However, the evidence points to a more active management of balance sheets. Financial institutions manage their balance sheets actively for several reasons.
They attempt to manage the key …nancial ratios so as to hit credit rating targets and the cost of capital. Their models of risk and economic capital also dictate Reserve, Flow of Funds, 1963 Funds, Q1 -2006 active management of their balance sheets. Economic capital is also closely related to performance measures such as return on equity (ROE).
However, even more striking than the scatter chart for commercial banks is that for security dealers and brokers, that include the major Wall Street investment banks. Figure 2 .5 is the scatter chart for U.S. security dealers and brokers, again drawn from the Flow of Funds accounts (1963 -2006) . The alignment of the observations is now the reverse of that for households. There is a strongly positive relationship between changes in total assets and changes in leverage. In this sense, leverage is pro-cyclical. Ayuso, Perez and Saurina (2004) exhibit similar evidence on regulatory capital over the cycle from panel data for Spanish banks.
In order to appreciate the aggregate consequences of pro-cyclical leverage, let us …rst consider the behavior of a …nancial intermediary that manages its balance sheet actively to as to maintain a constant leverage ratio of 10. Suppose the initial balance sheet is as follows. The …nancial intermediary holds 100 worth of securities, and has funded this holding with debt worth 90.
Assets
Liabilities Securities, 100 Equity, 10
Debt, 90
Assume that the price of debt is approximately constant for small changes in total assets. Suppose the price of securities increases by 1% to 101.
Assets Liabilities Securities, 101 Equity, 11
Leverage then falls to 101=11 = 9:18. If the bank targets leverage of 10, then it must take on additional debt of D to purchase D worth of securities on the asset side so that assets equity
The solution is D = 9. The bank takes on additional debt worth 9, and with this money purchases securities worth 9. Thus, an increase in the price of the security of 1 leads to an increased holding worth 9. The demand curve is upward-sloping.
After the purchase, leverage is now back up to 10.
Assets Liabilities Securities, 110 Equity, 11
Debt, 99
The mechanism works in reverse, too. Suppose there is shock to the securities price so that the value of security holdings falls to 109. On the liabilities side, it is equity that bears the burden of adjustment, since the value of debt stays approximately constant.
Assets Liabilities Securities, 109 Equity, 10
Leverage is now too high (109=10 = 10:9). The bank can adjust down its leverage by selling securities worth 9, and paying down 9 worth of debt. Thus, a fall in the price of securities of leads to sales of securities. The supply curve is downwardsloping. The new balance sheet then looks as follows.
Assets Liabilities Securities, 100 Equity, 10
The balance sheet is now back to where it started before the price changes. Leverage is back down to the target level of 10.
Leverage targeting entails upward-sloping demands and downward-sloping supplies. The perverse nature of the demand and supply curves are even stronger when the leverage of the …nancial intermediary is pro-cyclical -that is, when leverage is high during booms and low during busts. When the securities price goes up, the upward adjustment of leverage entails purchases of securities that are even larger than that for the case of constant leverage. If, in addition, there is illustrates the feedback during a boom.
The mechanism works exactly in reverse in downturns. If we hypothesize that greater supply of the asset tends to put downward pressure on its price, then there is the potential for a feedback e¤ect in which weaker balance sheets lead to greater sales of the asset, which depresses the asset's price and lead to even weaker balance sheets. Figure 2 .7 illustrates the feedback during a downturn.
When the feedback between price and leverage is taken into account, the …-nancial cycle may be ampli…ed due to the procyclical leverage of …nancial intermediaries. We now turn to the empirical evidence to ascertain how the leverage of …nancial intermediaries vary with balance sheet size. 
Evidence from Investment Bank Balance Sheets
We examine the quarterly changes in the balance sheets of …ve large investment banks, as listed below in Table 1 Investment banks are closest to the ideal of having balance sheets that are continuously marked to market. Our choice of these …ve banks is motivated by our concern to examine "pure play"investment banks that are not part of a larger commercial banking group so as to focus attention on their behavior with respect to the capital markets 1 . The stylized balance sheet of an investment bank is as follows.
Assets Liabilities Trading assets
Short positions Reverse repos Repos Other assets Long term debt Shareholder equity
On the asset side, traded assets are valued at market prices or are short term collateralized loans (such as reverse repos) for which the discrepancy between face value and market value are very small due to the very short term nature of the loans. On the liabilities side, short positions are at market values, and repos are very short term borrowing. We will return to a more detailed descriptions of repos and reverse repos below. Long-term debt is typically a very small fraction of the balance sheet.
2 For these reasons, investment banks provide a good approximation of the balance sheet that is continuously marked to market, and hence provide insights into how leverage changes with balance sheet size.
The second reason for our study of investment banks lies in their signi…cance for the …nancial system. Figure 3 .1 plots the size of securities …rms'balance sheets relative to that of commercial banks. We also plot the assets under management for hedge funds, although we should be mindful that "assets under management" 30% 1980 1982 1984 1986 1988 1990 1992 1994 1996 1998 2000 2002 2004 2006 Total Size is not the only issue. When balance sheets are marked to market, the responses to price changes will entail responses that may be disproportionately large. LTCM's balance sheet was small relative to the total …nancial sector, but its impact would have been underestimated if only size had been taken into account. Table 2 gives the summary statistics of the investment banks over the sample period.
[ Table 3 here] Table 3 shows the results of a panel regression for change in leverage. The negative relationship between the change in leverage and change in total assets is con…rmed in the the …nal column (column (v)) of Table 3 . The coe¢ cient on lagged leverage (i.e. previous quarter's leverage) is negative, suggesting that there is mean-reversion in the leverage ratio for the banks. Leverage is positively related to short-term debt, repos and collateralized borrowing. Notice, however, that there is no relationship between leverage and net collateralized …nancing.
More interestingly, the regressions reveal which items on the balance sheet are adjusting when balance sheets expand and contract. In particular, the regressions show that the margin of adjustment in the expansion and contraction of balance sheets is through repos and reverse repos. In a repurchase agreement (repo), an institution sells a security while simultaneously agreeing to buy it back at a pre-agreed price on a …xed future date. Such an agreement is tantamount to a collateralized loan, with the interest on the loan being the excess of the repurchase price over the sale price. From the perspective of the funds lender -the party who buys the security with the undertaking to re-sell it later -such agreements are called reverse repos. For the buyer, the transaction is equivalent to granting a loan, secured on collateral.
Repos and reverse repos are important …nancing activities that provide the funds and securities needed by investment banks to take positions in …nancial markets. For example, a bank taking a long position by buying a security needs to deliver funds to the seller when the security is received on settlement day. If the dealer does not fully …nance the security out of its own capital, then it needs to borrow funds. The purchased security is typically used as collateral for the cash borrowing. When the bank sells the security, the sale proceeds can be used to repay the lender.
Reverse repos are loans made by the investment bank against collateral. The bank's prime brokerage business vis-à-vis hedge funds will …gure prominently in the reverse repo numbers. The scatter chart gives a glimpse into the way in which changes in leverage are achieved through expansions and contractions in the collateralized borrowing and lending. We saw in our illustrative section on the elementary balance sheet arithmetic that when a bank wishes to expand its balance sheet, it takes on additional debt, and with the proceeds of this borrowing For a random variable W , the value at risk at con…dence level c relative to some base level W 0 is de…ned as the smallest non-negative number x such that
For instance, W could be the total marked-to-market assets of the …rm at some given time horizon. Then the value at risk is the equity capital that the …rm must hold in order to stay solvent with probability c. Financial intermediaries publish their value at risk numbers as part of their regulatory …lings, and also regularly disclose such numbers through their annual reports. Their economic capital is tied to the overall value at risk of the whole …rm, where the con…dence level is set at a level high enough (99.98%) to target a given credit rating (typically A or AA).
If …nancial intermediaries adjust their balance sheets to target economic capital, then we may conjecture that their disclosed value at risk …gures would be informative in reconstructing their actions. Denote by V the value at risk per dollar of assets held by a bank. If the bank maintains capital K to meet total value at risk, then we have
where A is total assets. Hence, leverage L satis…es
Procyclical leverage then translates directly to counter-cyclical nature of value at risk. Measured risk is low during booms and high during busts.
We explore the way in which the ratio of total value at risk to equity varies over time. Equation (4.1) suggests that it would be informative to track the ratio of value at risk to shareholder equity over time. The naive hypothesis would be that this ratio is kept constant over time by the bank. The naive hypothesis also ties in neatly the regulatory capital requirements under the 1996 Market Risk Amendment of the Basel capital accord. Under this rule, the regulatory capital is 3 times the 10 day, 99% value at risk. If total value risk is homogenous of degree 1, then (4.1) also describes the required capital for the bank, also. Table 4 presents the regressions for the quarterly change in the ratio of value at risk to equity. Value at risk numbers are those numbers that the banks themselves have reported in their 10-Q …lings. For the reasons outlined already, the …rm's self-assessed value at risk is closely tied to its assessment of economic capital, and we would expect behavior to be heavily in ‡uenced by changes in value at risk.
[ Table 4 here]
We focus on the ratio of value at risk to equity. In the panel regressions, the lagged value at risk to equity ratio is strongly negative, with coe¢ cients in the range of 0:5 to 0:6, suggesting rapid reversion to the mean. We take these as evidence that the banks use value at risk as a cue for how they adjust their balance sheets. However, the naive hypothesis that banks maintain a …xed ratio of value at risk to equity does not seem to be supported in the data. Column (ii)
of Table 4 suggests that an increase in the value at risk to equity ratio coincides with periods when the bank increases its leverage. Value at risk to equity is procyclical, when measured relative to leverage. However, total assets have a negative sign in column (v). It appears that value at risk to equity is procyclical, but total assets adjust down some of the e¤ects captured in leverage.
The evidence points to an additional, procyclical risk appetite component to banks'exposures that goes beyond the simple hypothesis of targeting a normalized value at risk measure. Perhaps we should not be too surprised at the positive relationship between risk appetite and leverage. For an individual bank, such behavior in the face of market movements may be an entirely natural, and rational response. However, if large swathes of the …nancial system behave in this way, the spillover e¤ects will be considerable. We now turn to the asset pricing consequences of such procyclical behavior.
Forecasting Risk Appetite
We now turn to the asset pricing consequences of balance sheet expansion and contraction. We have already noted how the demand and supply responses to price changes can become perverse when …nancial intermediaries' actions result leverage that co-vary positively with the …nancial cycle. We exhibit empirical evidence that the waxing and waning of balance sheets have a direct impact on asset prices through the ease with which traders, hedge funds and other users of credit can obtain funding for trades. System. Summary data are released publicly by the Fed each Thursday, one week after they are collected. The data are aggregated across all dealers, and are only available by asset class (that is, Treasuries, agencies, etc.). Individual issue data, and individual dealer data, are not released publicly.
Repos and reverse repos are an important subset of the security …nancing data.
The …nancing is reported on a gross basis, distinguishing between "securities in"
and "securities out"for each asset class. "Securities in"refer to securities received by a dealer in a …nancing arrangement (be it against other securities or cash), whereas "securities out" refer to securities delivered by a dealer in a …nancing arrangement (be it against securities or cash). For example, if a dealer enters into a repo, in which it borrows funds and provides securities as collateral, it would report securities out. Repos and reverse repos are reported across all sectors. The actual …nancing numbers reported are the funds paid or received. In the case of a repo, for example, a dealer reports the actual funds received on the settlement of the starting leg of the repo, and not the value of the pledged securities. In cases where only securities are exchanged, the market value of the pledged securities is reported.
We use the weekly repo and reverse repo data to forecast …nancial market conditions in the following week. Our measure of …nancial market conditions is the VIX index of the weighted average of the implied volatility in the S&P500 index options. The VIX index has found widespread application in empirical work as a proxy for market risk appetite. Ang, Hodrick, Xing, and Zhang (2006) show that VIX innovations are signi…cant pricing factors for the cross section of equity returns, and Bollerslev and Zhou (2007) show that the volatility risk premium -the di¤erence between the VIX and realized volatility of the S&P500 indexforecasts equity returns better than other commonly used forecasting variables (such as the P/E ratio or the term spread).
We use the daily VIX data from the website of the Chicago Board Options Exchange (www.cboe.com/micro/vix), and compute the S&P500 volatility from daily data over 21 trading day windows, corresponding to the maturity of the options that are used for the VIX calculation. We compute the volatility risk premium as the di¤erence between implied volatility and current volatility. This risk premium is closely linked to the payo¤ to volatility swaps, which are zero investment derivatives that return the di¤erence between realized future volatility and implied volatility over the maturity of the swap (see Carr and Wu (2004) for an analysis of variance and volatility swaps). We then compute averages of the VIX and the variance risk premium over each week (from the close of Wednesday to the close of the following Tuesday).
We are able to forecast both the level of the volatility risk premium, as well as the change in the volatility risk premium from one week to the next. We believe the latter result (the ability to forecast the innovation in the volatility risk premium) to be a very signi…cant result.
[ Table 5 here]
Our results are summarized in Table 5 and Table 6 . Table 5 shows the forecast regressions for the level of the volatility risk premium at the weekly frequency. In columns (i) and (ii) of Table 5 , we can see that when the level of the volatility risk premium is regressed on the growth in repos from week t 1 to week t, we obtain high signi…cance, especially when the lagged level of volatility risk premium is included in the regression. Columns (iii) and (iv) of Table 5 show that the change in reverse repos plays a similarly informative role in forecasting the level of the volatility risk premium.
The R 2 of the forecasting regressions is low when either the repo of reverse repos are used in isolation, but reach a level of 50% when used in conjuction with the lagged value of the volatility risk premium.
[ Table 6 here] Table 6 shows the forecasting regressions for the innovations in the volatility risk premium. Table 6 demonstrates that the hypothesis of balance sheet expansions leading to asset pricing consquences are borne out by the data. Changes in repo and reverse repo positions are highly signi…cant in forecasting the innovations in the volatility risk premium. In particular, when the lagged level in the volatility risk premium is included in the forecasting regression, the R 2 jumps to around 16%. Although 16% is much lower than the 50% or so for R 2 in the forecasting regression for levels of the volatility risk premium, we …nd it notable that innovations in the volatility risk premium can be forecast with such a high level of signi…cance.
The economic rationale for the forecasting regressions presented here is that when balance sheets expand through the increased collateralized lending and borrowing by …nancial intermediaries, the newly released funding resources then chase available assets for purchase. More capital is deployed in increasing trading positions through the chasing of yield, and the selling of the "tails", as in the selling of out of the money puts. If the increased funding for asset purchases result in the generalized increase in prices and risk appetite in the …nancial system, then the expansion of balance sheets will eventually be re ‡ected in the asset price changes in the …nancial system -hence, the ability of changes in repo positions to forecast future risk appetite.
Related Literature
The targeting of leverage seems intimately tied to the bank's attempt to target a particular credit rating. To the extent that the "passive" credit rating should ‡uctuate with the …nancial cycle, the fact that a bank's credit rating remains constant through the cycle suggests that banks manage their leverage actively, so as to shed exposures during downturns. Kashyap and Stein (2003) draw implications from such behavior for the pro-cyclical impact of the Basel II bank capital requirements.
To the extent that balance sheets play a central role in our paper, our discussion here is related to the large literature on the ampli…cation of …nancial shocks. The literature has distinguished two distinct channels. The …rst is the increased credit that operates through the borrower's balance sheet, where increased lending comes from the greater creditworthiness of the borrower (Bernanke and Gertler (1989) , Moore (1998, 2001) ). The second is the channel that operates through the banks' balance sheets, either through the liquidity structure of the banks'balance sheets (Bernanke and Blinder (1988) , Kashyap and Stein (2000) ),
or the cushioning e¤ect of the banks' capital (Van den Heuvel (2002)). Our discussion is closer to the latter group in that we also focus on the intermediaries' balance sheets. However, the added insight from our discussions is on the way that marking to maket enhances the role of market prices, and the responses that price changes elicit from intermediaries.
Our results also related to the developing theoretical literature on the role of liquidity in asset pricing (Allen and Gale (2004) , Acharya and Pedersen (2005) , Pedersen (2005a, 2005b) , Morris and Shin (2004) , Acharya, Shin and Yorulmazer (2007) ). The common thread is the relationship between funding conditions and the resulting market prices of assets. The theme of …-nancial distress examined here is also closely related to the literature on liquidity drains that deal with events such as the stock market crash of 1987 and the LTCM crisis in the summer of 1998. Gennotte and Leland (1990) and Geanakoplos (2003) provide analyses that are based on competitive equilibrium.
The impact of remuneration schemes on the ampli…cations of the …nancial cycle have been addressed recently by Rajan (2005) . The agency problems within a …nancial institution holds important clues on how we may explain procyclical behavior. Stein (1997) and Scharfstein and Stein (2000) present analyses of the capital budgeting problem within banks in the presence of agency problems.
The possibility that a market populated with value at risk (VaR) constrained traders may have more pronounced ‡uctuations has been examined by Danielsson, Shin and Zigrand (2004) . Mark-to-market accounting may at …rst appear to be an esoteric question on measurement, but we have seen that it has potentially important implications for …nancial cycles. Plantin, Sapra and Shin (2005) present a microeconomic model that compares the performance of marking to market and historical cost accounting systems.
Concluding Remarks on Aggregate Liquidity
Aggregate liquidity can be understood as the rate of growth of aggregate balance sheets. When …nancial intermediaries'balance sheets are generally strong, their leverage is too low. The …nancial intermediaries hold surplus capital, and they will attempt to …nd ways in which they can employ their surplus capital. In a loose analogy with manufacturing …rms, we may see the …nancial system as having "surplus capacity". For such surplus capacity to be utilized, the intermediaries must expand their balance sheets. On the liabilities side, they take on more short-term debt. On the asset side, they search for potential borrowers that they can lend to. Aggregate liquidity is intimately tied to how hard the …nancial intermediaries search for borrowers. In the sub-prime mortgage markets in the United States we have seen that when balance sheets are expanding fast enough, even borrowers that do not have the means to repay are granted credit -so intense is the urge to employ surplus capital. The seeds of the subsequent downturn in the credit cycle are thus sown. Jimenez and Saurina (2006) show from their study of Spanish banks that the loans granted during booms have higher default rates than those granted during leaner times.
In what sense is our notion of aggregate liquidity related to the traditional notion of liquidity as the money stock? In a …nancial system where deposittaking banks are the only leveraged institutions, their liabilities can be identi…ed with broad money. As such, the broad money stock would be a good indicator of the aggregate size of the balance sheets of leveraged institutions. To this extent, the growth of the money stock would play a useful role in signalling changes in the size of aggregate balance sheets.
Such a picture may have been a reasonably good description of the …nancial system in the …rst half of the 20th century, or in developing countries today.
However, for market-oriented …nancial systems such as in the United States, we cannot so readily identify the money stock with the aggregate size of the liabilities of leveraged institutions. This is so for two reasons. First, many of the leveraged institutions (investment banks, hedge funds, and others) do not conform to the textbook ideal of the deposit-funded bank. Hence, their liabilities are not counted as "money". Even for deposit-taking banks, not all items of liabilities qualify as money.
These points seem especially important for …nancial systems that rely on the capital market, rather than on the banking system. Perhaps the divergent empirical results for the United States and some European countries on the role of money in …nancial cycles can be attributed to the fact that the capital markets play a much bigger role in the former. 
